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Exhibit 3a for country office structure). Country managers were given considerable autonomy, provided 
that they complied with the Inditex code of conduct, which was “expressed in three principles: all of the 
activities of Inditex are undertaken in an ethical and responsible manner, all of the persons who maintain 
directly or indirectly, any employment, economic, social or industrial relation with Inditex will receive 
fair and honorable treatment and all Inditex’s activities will be carried out in a manner that is highly 
respectful to the environment.”2 Country managers were also expected to be proactive in social issues. 
Inditex was involved in many educational and human rights activities, which the company believed 
would strengthen the human capital of the communities in which it operated. Inditex also stressed that, in 
addition to getting the right product to the right place at the right time and with the right price, the 
product should be made under the right social conditions. To this end, the company had conducted more 
than 3,000 social audits to measure compliance with the Inditex code of conduct for manufacturers and 
reserved the right to visit a supplier’s factory at any time and talk to the workers.  
Aside from the central management described above, each Inditex brand was managed independently, 
with its own network of stores, logistics centers, and production facilities. At the headquarters, a brand’s 
collections were designed by in-house designers. Product flow was managed by commercials, as they were 
called, who were organized into teams to analyze and interpret the sales figures for around 40 stores in a 
geographical area. Commercials received an annual bonus, based on sales at the stores for which they 
were responsible. 
Each Inditex brand had regional networks of Dirección de Tiendas, equivalent to regional managers and 
known internally as DTs, who oversaw all aspects of operations and performance for about 15 stores and 
were evaluated on how well those stores performed. A DT’s annual bonus was based on sales, labor 
productivity, shrink, and team motivation. The DTs were headed by a DT country head. 
Inditex brands also had HR directors who supported the stores on all HR issues that were not linked 
to operations and who were organized by geographical area. The DTs and HR directors frequently 
collaborated to match the right store manager with the right store. Jean-Jacques Salaün, Inditex country 
manager for France, explained:  
In France, we have four levels of stores and type of managers. The stores are classified with the 
letters from A, the highest, to D, the lowest, according to their importance in terms of sales, 
location, strategic relevance, and employees. For each store level, we define the qualities that a 
manager must have, such as a certain level of managerial capacity and knowledge of the product. 
Every season, the manager will be evaluated on these qualities. The qualities required, as well as 
their responsibilities and what we expect from them, are in their contract. When managers do not 
perform well, the DT or HR directors will first try to help them. When we ask managers to change 
store because their performance is not good, they are not surprised. Other countries in the group 
have a similar approach. 
Zara  
Inditex’s oldest brand, Zara, was the pioneer of a new fashion category, called “fast-fashion”—trendy 
catwalk-inspired items manufactured quickly and sold at affordable prices.  Other fashion retailers, such 
as the Swedish Hennes & Mauritz (H&M) and the American Forever 21, had followed Zara’s fast-fashion 
example.  The Japanese Uniqlo, which had recently started an aggressive expansion strategy outside 
Japan, was also known for offering fashionable clothes at cheap prices.   
Zara was able to produce new items and deliver them to its stores in less than three weeks rather than 
the average six months needed for luxury brands. This allowed the firm to react to customer demand 
within the season.  In a typical season, Zara produced about 11,000 different items while key competitors 
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would typically produce 2,000-4,000.3 Jesús Echevarría Hernández, Chief Communications Officer of 
Inditex, explained:  
We have a triangle of information: the store managers, the DTs, and the commercials. The 
commercials receive sales figures daily and communicate with the store managers and the DTs 
daily to capture trends and interpret those figures. Store managers often ask to change a model 
(e.g., colors and sizes), introduce variations (e.g., short pants from long pants), or even design new 
clothes from scratch. If a lot of stores ask for similar changes, the commercials communicate these 
to the design team who will try to design the item and send it to all the stores.  
By 2008, Zara was by far Inditex’s largest brand. At the end of January 2009, it operated 1,520 stores 
and generated €6.8 billion in revenues. Zara ran three independent product lines: women’s, men’s, and 
children’s. Each was managed by a separate team of DTs, commercials, and designers (see Exhibit 3b for 
brand structure). At each store, the three product lines were managed by three independent section 
managers, each with a team of sales people and cashiers; the women’s section manager was also the 
overall store manager. The women’s line was Zara’s core business and was further organized into three 
collections: Women, Basic, and TRF. Echevarría explained, “The Women collection is more fashion and is 
moving at a very high speed. These items are placed in the front of the store, in the most important places. 
Basic also has a touch of fashion, but with more attractive prices. TRF is the young concept with denim 
and tee shirts.” 
Autonomy 
The culture at Zara encouraged fast decision-making, continuous improvement, and an emphasis on 
retaining the best people both at the stores and at headquarters. Isla explained: 
We take small decisions and improvements every day. Everything in our company is bottom-
up. This has a lot to do with our entrepreneurial spirit. The first person with a big entrepreneurial 
spirit is the store manager. One of the characteristics that the managers mention is the autonomy 
they have. Store managers feel like the owners of their stores. In particular, they value the freedom 
they have with the orders. We value this autonomy because it is crucial for us to retain talented 
people who like the business.  
Giving autonomy to store managers was particularly important because Zara operated in many 
locations with different local needs. For example, although Zara stores primarily offered a self-service 
shopping environment, customers in one of Paris’ most chic areas expected the security guard to keep 
their shopping bags while they browsed and expected personalized help from the staff—as if they were in 
a luxury shop. In Japan, customers expected to be greeted as they entered and exited the stores.  
The store managers’ autonomy also allowed Zara to generate ideas for improvement. For example, 
from the Japanese stores, Zara took the practice of having a five-minute staff meeting before opening time 
to discuss the day’s objectives. This practice became known elsewhere as “the Japanese meeting.” 
Echevarría commented, “You’ll get great ideas from the stores if you have the ability to hear them.” 
Corporate Control  
Despite Zara’s dedication to store managers’ autonomy, the firm made sure its brand was presented in 
a similar way to customers anywhere in the world and that all stores shared the Zara culture. Many store 
managers and DTs had experience in multiple locations. Cyril Boudarel, the head DT for Zara in France, 
had also worked at Zara locations in Turkey, Hong Kong, the United States, and Malaysia. Twice a year, 
Inditex country managers met to discuss the company’s culture and their own performance, expansion 
plans, and best practices. Zara DTs within a country met regularly to exchange information. 
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In each country, Zara section DT heads (women’s, men’s, and children’s) and Zara HR directors held 
weekly “brand meetings” with Inditex’s country manager and country HR director to discuss store 
performance and best practices. Salaün explained, “We cover the sales, the budget, the appointments, the 
sanctions, and all the operational points and make sure that Inditex’s culture and the law is respected at 
the local level. We also decide if we need to move a store manager and who needs to be promoted. If 
someone does not agree, it is like a veto.”  
DTs, HR directors, and country managers constantly visited stores to explain the culture directly to the 
staff and to monitor store performance. The DTs, in particular, were the transmitters of unwritten rules 
and policies. Stores received manuals that included information about the chain and its management, 
human resource practices, information systems, and the environment.  But for most store processes, there 
were no process manuals.  Instead, there was a common way of doing things within each country. For 
example, all Zara stores in France managed replenishment from backrooms similarly. Cashiers were not 
supposed talk to each other while ringing up customers and section managers were not supposed to take 
breaks at the same time. If DTs, who spent 80% of their time visiting stores, observed deviation, they were 
not shy about letting the store manager know and asking him or her to work on it.  
Isla also visited the stores frequently. He explained: 
My main objective is to make sure that there is no disconnection between the store and 
headquarters and that what the store is feeling is transmitted. When I visit a store I usually ask, 
“What are you missing? What should you have that you don’t have? How is your relation with the 
commercials? What support are you getting from the country structure? What HR problems do you 
have?” We are a very store-driven organization but, as we grow, to avoid becoming a bureaucratic 
company, we need to make efforts. I also want to know if store managers are knowledgeable about 
the products. I usually ask them to show me the newest products they received and tell me what 
they think about them.  
Zara’s Supply Chain  
Zara’s two main selling seasons were autumn/winter and spring/summer. Six months before the 
beginning of each selling season, Zara’s design teams presented the first designs and Zara committed 
about 30% of its production to its suppliers. For the less fashion-oriented collections, the commitments 
were larger. During the season itself, Zara’s proximity factories with short lead times allowed it to 
introduce new designs based on fashion trends and customer needs. For more basic products, which were 
easier to forecast, Zara used cheaper suppliers with longer lead times (see Exhibit 4 for details on 
locations and lead times).  
All products, regardless of their origin or destination, came to logistics centers in Spain before being 
sent to the stores. Even for stores in Asia, a product produced in an Asian factory would first come to 
Spain and then be distributed by air. Airfreight cost was about 1% of the selling price. The Arteixo 
logistics center in A Coruña managed 50% of the women’s and men’s merchandise and served Spain, 
Portugal, the Americas, and the Middle East. The Zaragoza center managed the remaining 50% and also 
served non-Iberian Europe, Russia, and Asia (see Exhibit 5 for Zara store locations). The Meco center in 
Madrid managed children’s wear for all Zara stores. Most countries also had small warehouses for extra 
or returned merchandise and for inter-store transfers.  
The Ordering Cycle 
At the beginning of each season, the new collections were sent to the stores in quantities decided by 
the commercials. Each store received about 25,000 units within a two-week period. But once new 
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products arrived at the stores, it was up to section managers to order replenishments. Twice a week, each 
section manager received a morning “offer” through his or her PDA. The offer listed the products that the 
logistics centers had in stock, with descriptions, photos, and a history of how many of that product the 
store had already received and sold. Section managers used these data along with their own forecasts of 
customer demand and their knowledge of store inventory to decide how many units of each item to 
order. The IT systems did not provide store-inventory data; section managers knew their inventory by 
spending most of their time on the selling floor. Section managers sent their orders by the end of the day.  
European stores received their deliveries within 24 hours; those in Asia and the Americas received 
deliveries within 40 hours. Each week, stores received about 12,000 units (8,000 for women’s, 2,000 for 
men’s, 2,000 for children’s). But they almost never received exactly what they had ordered. Because 
inventory at the logistics centers was limited, it was allocated to stores according to their orders and their 
previous sales. For this reason, section managers tended to over order. Julien Lancelin, the store manager 
of Zara Opera, a store based in a fashionable area of Paris, said: 
In theory, you can order twice a week so you only need to order for three or four days’ of sales. 
But if the item is successful, by the time you order it again, it might already be out of stock. For 
example, one month ago I received 20 items of a new jacket. I sold them in one day. In my first 
order, I asked for 150, which I sold in less than four days. Then I ordered 200, but I received only 
100. When I ordered it again, it was out of stock. As it was a bestseller and several shops asked for 
the same item, the commercials decided to produce it again. Yet, I had to wait for almost three 
weeks, which is the time it takes to re-produce an item. I have ordered it again but I am not sure I 
will receive it.  
Ordering was especially challenging for new products. Lancelin explained: 
 I just received these new items in the morning and, by 10 p.m., I need to pass my order. I do not 
have much time to decide if I want to order the new items or not and in which volumes. So I’ll 
immediately put these new clothes in an area where people will see them. If the deliveries are late 
or the product is not well placed, I will need to pass the order without observing customers’ 
reactions. 
Recent Improvements 
Isla had introduced several improvements to Zara’s logistics and merchandise planning. For example, 
he reduced transportation costs by consolidating transportation across Zara’s different brands and 
invested €100 million to open a state-of-the-art logistics center for children’s merchandise in Madrid in 
2007.  
Several improvements involved shifting time-consuming work away from store employees. For 
example, when new merchandise was delivered to Zara stores, store employees had been unloading the 
trucks themselves. Isla had the third-party logistics providers who were making the deliveries bring the 
packed merchandise off the truck and onto the selling floor. Employees had also been attaching alarm 
tags to newly delivered products, which ate up considerable time and kept the products in the backrooms 
for an extra day. Isla had this task shifted to the factories.  
In 2006, Zara introduced automatic replenishment for basic products (10-15% of all products) that 
were easier to forecast. Although some store managers were initially hesitant to give up control of their 
inventory, they realized that the change allowed them to dedicate more time to fashion products. Besides, 
they could always communicate any problems they saw to the commercials. Working with academics in 
operations management, Zara developed an algorithm for allocating inventory at logistics centers to 
stores and was now trying to optimize clearance pricing. Isla explained:  
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We tend to internally design our systems to fit our needs. Everything in our company is a 
combination of good systems and maintaining the human touch. It’s impossible to think that we 
are just going to follow what the program or the formula suggests. We are managing so many 
thousands of references that we need these tools, but they will never replace the essence of our 
decision-making process. Some people think that this model is risky, but it is not. That is because 
Inditex is based on thousands of people taking thousands of small decisions. Orders happen twice 
per week. The store manager doesn’t take a decision with a 10% impact on total sales. Commercials 
can easily spot if a manager is making mistakes and the software would help them detect this. 
Zara Stores  
Zara stores were in prime locations. An average store was 1,200 m2 in size and carried about 40,000 
units of inventory. But stores varied greatly in size and layout. Zara put a lot of emphasis on creating 
attractive interior designs that conveyed freedom and quiet comfort to the customer,4 but also on ensuring 
that merchandise and shop windows were presented similarly in all Zara stores. Teams of merchandisers 
created displays at the test store in A Coruña, decided on the look, took photos of how they wanted the 
items to be displayed, and sent the photos to stores (see Exhibit 6 for a sample photo). The shop windows 
were changed every three to four weeks by regional window dressers responsible for about four stores.  
Store displays were managed by section managers and store merchandisers who tried to keep as 
close as possible to the photos sent by headquarters. Cyril Boudarel, DT head of Zara France and Zara 
Women France, explained: 
The merchandise moves fast and the shop changes every day. The section manager receives a 
layout picture but they might not have all the items; they could have sold out an item or may never 
have ordered it. We have regional merchandisers who tell the section managers and store 
merchandiser, “You cannot present this item like that,” and together they try to come up with an 
alternative. 
If the section managers disagreed with headquarters’ guidelines, they could take a picture of the changed 
layout and send it to the regional and central merchandisers for approval. The changes sent by the section 
managers were tested in the A Coruña store. Boudarel said, “We want people with ideas. If a store has a 
good one, I let them do it. I’ll come and check first. They cannot do it alone because if it works I want to 
share it with other stores. This is also good for brand consistency. We want Zara stores to be recognized 
as such everywhere in the world.”  
Store Management  
An average Zara store had 70 employees, 60% of whom were part-time sales associates. The key 
positions were the three section managers, who managed all aspects of store operations; the women’s 
section manager was also the overall store manager. Section managers recruited and managed staff, 
worked with merchandisers on store layout, and managed in-store logistics and customer service. They 
were constantly on the selling floor working with merchandise, observing customer needs, and helping 
staff. In fact, a section manager did not have an office or even a chair on the selling floor. A few section 
managers were specialists in HR, replenishment, or management; they were part of the DT team and were 
sent to other stores to advise colleagues who were having problems. Newly appointed section managers 
did not necessarily receive any formal training; many had already learned the job as assistant managers 
(segundas) receiving constant feedback from DTs.  
Section managers were evaluated by HR directors and DTs. This evaluation was based on sales, 
employee productivity (measured as sales divided by employee hours), shrink, store atmosphere, 
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merchandising, knowledge of the merchandise, staff image, recruitment, training, employee turnover and 
absenteeism, and how well the section manager evaluated his or her own staff’s performance. (DTs 
visited the stores so often that they were familiar enough with the employees to gauge how well the 
sections manager was evaluating them.) Section managers received a competitive salary, determined by 
HR at headquarters, and a bonus based solely on how well they achieved sales targets. Boudarel 
commented: 
To achieve sales, managers need an efficient and trained team and have to manage the store 
well. Yet, when we open a new store in a new country, customers will come for the product and the 
brand. The manager can just cover the bases. But in mature markets and in a moment of crisis, the 
managers have to adapt to the situation and do everything well—the merchandising, the orders, 
and so on.  
Sales associates were organized by section (women’s, men’s, and children’s). Those working in the 
women’s section were also organized by collection. Section managers tried to match the sales associates 
with the right collections. Within the women’s section, for example, they often had more fashion-oriented 
employees working in Women, faster employees working in Basic (the largest department with the most 
folding to do), and younger employees working in TRF.  
Retaining Store Staff 
Zara’s business model relied on experienced and committed store employees. It was important to keep 
turnover low and, in fact, Zara enjoyed lower turnover (on average, around 15% for sales associates and 
much lower for store managers) than most other large retailers. Employee turnover varied greatly across 
countries and locations, however, going over 15% in large cities and reaching around 30% in Russia.  
Sales associates’ compensation was set by HR at headquarters. Overall, the starting wages were higher 
than those in other retail stores. All store employees, including the part-timers, also received a 
commission. A percent of each store’s monthly sales was divided among the store’s employees according 
to the number of hours each had worked and his or her position. 
Ninety percent of the store managers had been promoted from within. It was not uncommon for a 
part-time employee to rise through the ranks and become a section manager in only two years, then go on 
to become a DT or a commercial. But stores in mature areas such as Paris had started losing their part-
time employees because there were not enough opportunities for them to become full-timers. Although 
part-timers had the same benefits as full-timers, they could not accumulate responsibilities and be 
promoted. In France, stores came up with a way to reduce part-time employee turnover by allowing some 
part-timers to work full-time hours but in two stores. By summer 2009, 370 employees had that contract. 
One corporate initiative to reduce employee turnover was to provide employees their work schedules one 
month in advance.  But as of summer 2009, stores tended to follow local legislation or common practices 
on the matter. In France, for example work schedules had to be provided two weeks in advance by law.  
In the United States, there was no such law so Zara adopted the common practice of providing schedules 
one week in advance.  
Motivation was important. There was a lot of physical work to do and there was constant monitoring 
by section managers, DTs, and HR directors to put up with. Echevarría explained: 
It’s a really tough but rewarding job. When you have a very busy store, it’s really hard to keep 
the tables with the folded clothes in neat piles while customers are taking and looking at the items 
every second. We say that the store must never fall apart, which happens when the tables are a 
mess, or we have sweaters where the pants are. If you are not motivated in this group, this is too 
much work. Yet if you love the job you will be amazingly loved:  It is absolutely rewarding to see 
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so directly the consequences of your work when, for example, a customer leaves the store satisfied 
with purchases that you have helped him or her to find. 
To meet these demands, section managers tried to hire sales associates with a strong interest in fashion 
and a strong capacity to learn. These were the employees who would be motivated by the frequent arrival 
of new merchandise and the opportunity to perform different functions. Many Zara employees also felt 
proud to be part of an organization that took action on social issues. Sales associates were usually hired 
under a part-time contract and then promoted to full-time and other roles.  When they first started, they 
often received a one week on the job training. 
Managing Customer Service 
Zara’s target customers were young, fashion-conscious people who were interested in buying 
inexpensive clothes. These customers came frequently to see the new products. When they liked 
something, they often bought it immediately because they knew it might not be there next time. Most 
customers did not expect personalized attention from sales associates. In fact, sales associates were taught 
as a first rule not to bother customers and to offer assistance only if directly approached or if they noticed 
that someone needed help. Boudarel explained, “Customers come to Zara for the product and usually 
they do not have time. We can help them to choose a fitting, but it is very quick.”  
Good customer service at Zara meant presenting the merchandise well for customers, being available 
when customers needed help, and making sure customers didn’t have to wait long for a cashier.i As 
Boudarel put it, “Our staff is more involved in managing products than managing customers. Therefore, 
we need sales associates who can fold and talk at the same time.” 
Ensuring this kind of customer service depended heavily on having enough staff. Staffing levels at the 
stores were determined by DTs and HR directors in collaboration with section managers. HR directors 
budgeted hours for each store and section every month based on historical data, sales forecasts prepared 
by DTs and section managers, and any adjustments that were necessary. Boudarel explained, “When we 
prepare the sales budget, I ask the managers how much they think they will make. Then we adjust the 
budget together. The managers always tend to underestimate how much they will sell.” Section managers 
used these monthly payroll budgets to decide on daily staffing levels and employee schedules, taking into 
account daily workload, employee availability, and labor contracts (Exhibit 7 shows how sales and labor 
hours vary over time. Exhibit 8 shows how labor hours vary within a given day). But knowing how 
important sufficient staffing was for customer service, Zara did not put too much emphasis on meeting 
monthly payroll budgets.  
Customers with complaints, questions, and comments could call, email, or send a letter to 
headquarters. In 2008, Zara received about 21,800 electronic queries. Other than this count, Zara did not 
track measures of customer service. Instead, it focused on one metric:  sales.  
Managing In-store Logistics 
Much of a sales associate’s work was managing in-store logistics, which consisted of (1) processing 
deliveries, (2) managing product flow between the backroom and the selling floor, (3) managing display 
areas and fitting rooms, and (4) conducting physical audits. 
Processing Deliveries 
                                                          
i Every section had several sales associates trained as cashiers. In the women’s section of Zara Opera, for example, 22 of the 38 
associates could operate a cash register.  
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At least twice a week, stores received early-morning deliveries from third-party logistics companies. 
Store employees arriving at work around 7 a.m. would typically find the new merchandise on the selling 
floor, either in sealed boxes or else on hangers and each item wrapped in plastic.  
These deliveries were then processed by section managers (or assistant section managers), the 
merchandising coordinator, and the sales associates. They had to move the boxes and hangers to where 
there was room to open them, remove the plastic covers from items on hangers or in boxes, and move 
some items from the lightweight hangers on which they were shipped to sturdier hangers for display. The 
boxes and hangers held mixed products; the same tee shirt, for example, might turn up in four different 
boxes along with pants, shorts, and other tee shirts. Products were sorted for shelving. The merchandising 
coordinator and section managers decided where to place the new designs; everything else was shelved 
by sales associates.  
The night before a delivery, headquarters sent each store a list of items it would receive. Section 
managers were responsible for checking the accuracy of the shipment. For products that arrived in boxes, 
they checked the number of boxes received against the number they were supposed to have received. For 
products that arrived on hangers, they checked the quantity of each reference (regardless of the color or 
size).  
Each section manager had his or her own way of managing the delivery processing. But the rule for 
everyone was that, by the time the store was ready to open, the selling floor had to be ready for 
customers. Section managers also had productivity targets. In France, for example, they were encouraged 
to process at least 85 units of new merchandise per hour per person; if they consistently fell below that, 
the DTs intervened.  
Managing Backroom Replenishment  
There was not enough selling space to keep all units on the floor. In an average store, 30% of inventory 
was kept in the backroom. Boudarel explained:  
Inditex’s policy is “big store, small backroom.” If we had everything on the shop floor, we 
would need around 1,600 square meters. But we probably don’t want to display all units anyway. 
We don’t want our stores to look crowded. And in many countries, it is hard to find big spaces in 
good locations and with nice backrooms. In France, 60% of the merchandise is in the backroom and 
occasionally we have backrooms outside the store. External backrooms are also used in other 
countries, like Japan, where the floor is very expensive. 
 The backrooms had another function. The company policy was not to keep a product on the selling 
floor unless all sizes were available. But with Zara’s frequent product changes, stores usually had 
products for which they didn’t have all sizes. In such cases, sales associates put the item in the backroom 
until the store received the missing sizes. If production had stopped for that item, it might remain in the 
backroom until the clearance period. But if production had stopped and the item was a bestseller, most 
countries would centralize the remaining units in a warehouse and send them to the stores with the 
highest sales for that item.  
Ensuring accurate in-store logistics was labor-intensive. In France, for example, sales associates 
checked the selling floor each morning to see if they had all the sizes for each item on display. If not, they 
replenished the missing sizes from the back room if the sizes were there. Different sections used different 
rules for how many units of each size should be displayed. A Zara Opera sales associate explained, “For 
jeans, we should have two units per size for the more common sizes and one unit for the others. In 
another Zara store in Paris, which has a lot of traffic and an external backroom, we keep more units on the 
shop floor.” Because sales associates were so familiar with the store, they generally knew how many units 
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of each size were appropriate and where to find them in the backroom. If they consistently made 
mistakes, section managers intervened.  
The first replenishment from the backroom each morning was important because it was the reference 
for the following ones. For the rest of the day, Zara sales associates performed the so-called “24.” Every 
hour, one sales associate from the women’s department and one from the men’s department would collect 
from all the cashiers in the store a list of all sales in the last hour and replenish sold items from the 
backroom. This was also done in the children’s department, but less frequently.  
Managing Display Areas and Fitting Rooms 
Associates constantly folded the products to keep the display tables looking orderly, spotted 
misplaced products on the selling floor and put them back where they belonged, and checked the fitting 
room areas to collect products that belonged to their own areas. They also kept an eye on what was 
selling and what the customers were looking for, communicating any trends they observed to their 
section managers. During busy periods, section managers in some stores assigned sales associates to stay 
near the fitting rooms to help customers and manage products in those areas.  
Physical Audits 
Every three weeks, the sales associates conducted a partial inventory which would take around 40 
minutes. The main objective was to monitor shrink rather than to ensure the accuracy of inventory data. 
Boudarel explained, “We scan what goes out but not what comes in, as we do not have time during the 
deliveries. Thus, every three weeks we scan a part of the store by model, color, and size.” Staff would also 
conduct an audit of the store’s physical inventory one to three times per season. Boudarel explained: 
We start the physical audit in the backroom before the store closes and do the selling floor once 
we close. In total, it takes around two and a half hours and the whole store works on this. If, the 
first time that we do the physical audit, all is fine, we only do one audit per season. With the 
inventory and the physical audit we discover, on average, 1% shrink, which is calculated over the 
total volumes, not by model.  
The Next Step 
Although Inditex had never come near to bankruptcy, Isla had—as founder Ortega Gaona had 
predicted—found a lot of things to change. This year, the need to improve efficiency had never been more 
urgent. Although Inditex had suffered less than other retailers in the 2008 world economic crisis, its 
growth had slowed down. It had opened 145 stores in the first quarter of 2008, but only 95 in the first 
quarter of 2009.   
Labor was the largest operating expense at the stores and any change to improve labor productivity 
would have significant profit implications. Isla thought several changes might help improve labor 
productivity.  For example, store managers could be encouraged to find ways to improve labor 
productivity if part of their bonus depended on it.  Standardizing store processes, especially for in-store 
logistics processes, could also help.  Alternatively, processing of deliveries, which took approximately 5% 
of all the time employees spent at the stores, could be outsourced to third parties. Isla had already 
outsourced the unloading of new merchandise from the trucks into the stores because third-party logistics 
companies could do this work more quickly and with cheaper labor. He had no doubt that outsourcing 
process delivery would save even more time and money. But he knew he had to be careful. Could an 
emphasis on improving labor productivity hurt other aspects of store operations?  
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1975 Zara Mid-quality, very 
fashionable, low prices.  
 
6,824 1,520* 1,447,313 159 72
1991 Pull and 
Bear 
Internally developed brand. 
14 to 28 age range, more 
sporty and for daily wear, 
competitive price, very 
young fashion language. 
 
720 583 158,927 64 39
1991 Massimo 
Dutti 
Acquired. For age 25 and 
up, more expensive than 
Zara. 
 
722 470 130,618 44 38
1998 Bershka Internally developed. More 
trendy and radical, casual 
nightwear. 
 
1.026 591 211,436 81 40
1999 Stradivarius Acquired. Only women’s 
wear, for age 25 and up, 
fashionable but more 
traditional. 
 
633 456 116,835 75 31
2001 Oysho Internally developed. 
Underwear for women. 
 
242 374 51,925 84 23
2003 Zara Home Internally developed. 
Textiles and home 
decoration items. 
 
222 239 59,655 35 24
2008 Uterqüe Internally developed. 
Fashion accessories. 
17 31 4,180 31 3
Source: Case writers, from company data and Inditex S.A., Annual Reports 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, available at 
http://www.inditex.com/en/shareholders_and_investors/investor_relations/annual_reports, accessed in June 2009. 
* At year end, the number of Zara stores included 228 Zara Kid Stores 
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Exhibit 2 Inditex Information 
a) Key Figures  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Results (€ millions)  
Net sales  5,670 6,741 8,196 9,435 10,407 
Cost of merchandise  2,636 2,953 3,589 4,086 4,493 
Gross profit  3,034 3,788 4,607 5,349 5,914 
EBITDA  1,240 1,459 1,790 2,149 2,187 
EBIT  925 1,094 1,356 1,652 1,608 
Net income  628 811 1,010 1,250 1,253 
  
Inventory (€ millions)  
Raw materials  37.9 35.7 38.7 46.4 45.6 
Work In process 16.9 17.1 18.1 23.8 17.1 
Finished goods  463.0 631.6 767.2 937.0 991.5 
  
Stores and Employees  
Selling surface (m2)* 1,175,070 1,434,752 1,657,299 1,914, 493 2,180,889 
Number of stores at year end 2,244 2,692 3,131 3,691 4,264 
Total staffing costs (including social 
security contributions by Inditex) 
840 1,037 1,251 1,473 1,703 
Number of employees 47,046 58,190 69,240 79,517 89,112 
Source: Inditex S.A., Annual Reports 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, available at 
http://www.inditex.com/en/shareholders_and_investors/investor_relations/annual_reports, accessed in June 2009. 
* Selling surface as of January 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
 
 





America Asia Africa 
Stores 3,322 234 338 358 12 
Units manufactured* 326 >81 >13 >255 >35 
Number of employees 71,000 7,000 >8,000 >2,500 N/A 
Source: Inditex S.A., Annual Report 2008, available at 




c) Percentage of Employees by Function in 2008 
 Stores Logistics Headquarters Manufacturing
% of employees 89.3 5.8 3.5 1.3
Source: Inditex S.A., Annual Report 2008, available at 
http://www.inditex.com/en/shareholders_and_investors/investor_relations/annual_reports, accessed in June 2009. 
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Exhibit 3 Zara Country and Brand Organizational Structure  
a) Country Office Structure 
 













(based in the region)  
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Finance Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Real Estate 
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Exhibit 3 (Cont.)  
b) Brand Structure (excluding HR directors) 
 
 





DT Zara Country Head (also DT 
country Head for Women) 
Zara DT Men 










































Purchased by Universidad Autonoma de Occidente (compras@uao.edu.co) on August 03, 2012
Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 610-042 
15 
Exhibit 4 Inditex's Suppliers by Geographical Area, 2008  
Areas Number of 
suppliers 
% production Lead time 
Proximity (Spain, Portugal, 
Morocco) 
516 49% 17 days on average;  
minimum 48 hours 
 
Other Europe (mainly Turkey, 
also Bulgaria and Romania) 
91 14% 5-6 weeks 
 








Asia (China, India, Cambodia, 
Bangladesh) 
417 35% 3-8 months 
Source: Case writers, based on field interviews. 
 
 
Exhibit 5 Zara Store Locations 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Europe N/A N/A 761 1,092 1,188
Asia-Pacific N/A N/A 50 65 96
Americas N/A N/A 130 149 173
Middle East & Africa N/A N/A 49 55 63
Total 723 852 990 1,361 1,520
Source: Inditex S.A., Annual Reports from 2004 to 2008, available at 
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 Exhibit 6 Example of a Merchandising Photo, Women’s Section, Zara Opera Store, Paris, France. 
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Exhibit 7 Percentage of Sales and Labor Hours Used during a 12-Day Period in Women’s, Children’s 
and Men’s Sections at a Zara Store. 
 
 
Source: Company data. 
 
Purchased by Universidad Autonoma de Occidente (compras@uao.edu.co) on August 03, 2012
610-042 Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 
18 
Exhibit 8 Total Scheduled Time (in Minutes) for Sales Associates in the Women’s Section at one Store in 
a Representative Week.  
 
Source: Case writers’ analysis of the schedules created by the store manager at one Zara store. 
Note: These hours do not include any salaried employee hours. This Zara store is closed on Sundays. 
 
Day Time
 Total    
# of 
Minutes Day Time
 Total     
# of 
Minutes Day Time
Total    
# of 
Minutes Day Time
Total    
# of 
Minutes Day Time
 Total     
# of 
Minutes Day Time
Total    
# of 
Minutes 
6-7am 60 6-7am 0 6-7am 0 6-7am 60 6-7am 0 6-7am 0
7-8am 370 7-8am 0 7-8am 0 7-8am 360 7-8am 0 7-8am 0
8-9am 420 8-9am 50 8-9am 20 8-9am 360 8-9am 40 8-9am 30
9-10am 480 9-10am 355 9-10am 195 9-10am 455 9-10am 335 9-10am 255
10-11am 790 10-11am 500 10-11am 440 10-11am 800 10-11am 680 10-11am 500
11-12pm 840 11-12pm 600 11-12pm 540 11-12pm 900 11-12pm 780 11-12pm 620
12-1pm 945 12-1pm 610 12-1pm 540 12-1pm 900 12-1pm 850 12-1pm 740
1-2pm 780 1-2pm 765 1-2pm 680 1-2pm 745 1-2pm 970 1-2pm 880
2-3pm 745 2-3pm 795 2-3pm 725 2-3pm 740 2-3pm 975 2-3pm 980
3-4pm 855 3-4pm 835 3-4pm 695 3-4pm 740 3-4pm 1015 3-4pm 1005
4-5pm 660 4-5pm 915 4-5pm 705 4-5pm 760 4-5pm 895 4-5pm 1010
5-6pm 695 5-6pm 715 5-6pm 660 5-6pm 830 5-6pm 730 5-6pm 955
6-7pm 610 6-7pm 720 6-7pm 660 6-7pm 785 6-7pm 665 6-7pm 845
7-8pm 600 7-8pm 720 7-8pm 660 7-8pm 670 7-8pm 660 7-8pm 840
8-9pm 545 8-9pm 665 8-9pm 660 8-9pm 605 8-9pm 605 8-9pm 730
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style,” The Observer, June 5, 2005, accessed via Factiva in June 2009. 
2 2007 Inditex Annual Report. 
3 Andrew McAfee, Vincent Dessain, and Anders Sjöman, “Zara: IT for Fast Fashion”, HBS Case No. 604-081 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2004), p. 7. 
4 2008 Inditex Annual Report, p. 39. 
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